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Abstract 
For millennia human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the 
fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person.  Rather, an 
individual’s own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his/her evaluation, reward 
and punishment.  In a series of studies we investigate whether such rules guide the judgments of 
children. The first three studies demonstrate that children view lucky others as more likely than 
unlucky others to perform intentional good actions.  Children similarly assess the siblings of 
lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky 
others. The next three studies demonstrate that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky 
people are nicer than unlucky people. The final two studies find that Japanese children also 
demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed 
in relation to Lerner’s just world theory and Piaget’s immanent justice research and in relation to 
the development of intergroup attitudes. 
Keywords/phrases (up to 5): preference for the lucky, immanent justice, evaluative contagion, 
social cognitive development, cross-cultural psychology     Judgments of the Lucky 3 
Judgments of the lucky across development and culture 
In many societies and legal systems across time, one moral tenet has reigned supreme.  
Individuals are to be judged by the purposeful actions they commit, and not by the random 
events that befall them. This understanding has been broad and deep, evident across time and 
place, from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Roman Law (e.g., animus nocendi), and English 
law (e.g., mens rea) to the Modern Penal Law in the United States and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. This fundamental moral dictum was most clearly described in the 
13
th century by Henry Bracton: “A crime is not committed unless an intention to injure exists.”  
From it we have the practice that volitional and premeditated behaviors such as stealing and 
cheating are punished, just as hard work and helping others are rewarded – these actions speak to 
the character of the person performing them.  On the other hand, we treat differently those 
behaviors that involve accidental, unintentional, and random causes.  Whether the outcomes 
themselves are good or bad, such as winning a lottery or being hit by a tornado, we are to treat 
these as not reflecting on the character of the actor, as poor candidates for showering praise or 
blame, reward or punishment.   
Even when it comes to intentional behavior, we hold that it is those who are involved in 
producing it who should be held responsible or praised, not those who happen to be associated 
with them via group membership.  The Bible supports this belief clearly, “The fathers shall not 
be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every 
man shall be put to death for his own sin” (Deuteronomy, 24:16, King James Version).  The 
belief that deems “guilt by association” to be immoral is also broad and deep, being upheld by 
the oldest moral codes from Ptahotep and the Assize of Clarendon to most modern legal doctrine 
(Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000).      Judgments of the Lucky 4 
Our research concerns the dissociation between these ratified codes of conduct and the 
behavior of ordinary humans. It seeks to understand the disparity between belief and action, 
between abstractly held ideals and everyday moral judgments of good and bad.  In these studies 
we investigate the developmental aspects of such dissociations by analyzing the relatively early 
manifestation of such discrepancies in childhood. Do children recognize that the random bad 
events that befall others do not make them blameworthy? Do they understand that other people 
who are associated with an unlucky individual are not blameworthy? Observing children as they 
grapple with such questions can provide an understanding of the developmental origins of adult 
minds that routinely offer such judgments with consequence.   
We explore this question in the context of two empirical phenomena—preference for the 
lucky (over the unlucky), and the evaluation of an individual based on his/her association with 
another actor, what we call evaluative contagion.  Preference for the lucky is simply the greater 
liking, greater preference, or more positive attitude toward those who experience randomly 
occurring good or “lucky” events (e.g., finding $5 on the sidewalk) than toward those who 
experience random bad or “unlucky” events (e.g., getting splashed by a passing car). More 
complex evaluations, which we call judgments of the lucky, involve thinking, for example, that 
lucky people are more likely to perform good actions than unlucky people. We use the term 
“random” as the overarching term for lucky and unlucky events, standing in clear contrast to 
actions that we term “intentional”.  Whereas intentional actions tend to be intended and foreseen, 
random events, for our purposes, are those that are not intended or foreseen by the targets of 
those actions.  
Evaluative contagion refers to the extension of evaluations of one actor to his or her 
associates, such as family or social group members. For example, disliking the sibling of     Judgments of the Lucky 5 
someone who was splashed by a passing car would be an example of evaluative contagion, 
because the negative evaluation of the target of the action (the person splashed) has spread to the 
sibling of that target. Such evaluations are important not only theoretically, but may also have 
important implications for work on the development of prejudice toward disadvantaged groups. 
That is, insofar as members of disadvantaged groups tend to experience more unlucky events, a 
dislike of people associated with others who experience unlucky events could lead to prejudice 
against members of families or social groups who themselves have not experienced bad or 
unlucky events. 
We seek to establish the generality and breadth of these phenomena across age and 
culture. As we discuss below, there are several theories relevant to a preference for the lucky. 
One way to evaluate how well these theories explain the preference for the lucky is to examine 
the developmental predictions of these theories, and to look for convergence or divergence 
between these theories and the preference for the lucky across development. Therefore, one goal 
of this paper is to investigate how the evaluations of the lucky and evaluative contagion might 
increase or decrease across development, and what these changes imply for alternative 
explanations of these effects. 
Additionally, this work seeks to understand whether these phenomena are cross-culturally 
invariant or whether something about American or Western culture might lead young children to 
prefer the lucky and their associates. Previous research (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004, Morris & 
Peng, 1994) has demonstrated that Westerners tend to use dispositional attributions to explain 
behavior (e.g., he tripped because he was clumsy) as compared to Easterners, who tend to use 
situational explanations (e.g., he tripped because there was a cord on the floor). One possible 
explanation for children’s preference for the lucky could be that children are making     Judgments of the Lucky 6 
dispositional explanations for the lucky events. Such an explanation leads to the prediction that 
children growing up in a country that tends to use situational explanations for behavior will not 
show this preference. In an initial exploration of the universality of this preference and its 
contagious nature, we therefore presented young Japanese children with the same tasks. 
Immanent Justice and Belief in a Just World 
As early as 6 months of age children appear to have a basic understanding of differences 
between intentional action and unintentional action (Woodward, 1998), and by 3 years of age 
children are able to distinguish intentional from unintentional actions in linguistic tasks (Shultz 
& Wells, 1985; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980).  Nevertheless, considerable evidence suggests 
that this distinction is not the only guide to children’s evaluations of others.  Children’s tendency 
to evaluate others on the basis of unintentional acts has been stated or implied by several 
prominent theories, most notably work on Immanent Justice (Piaget, 1932/1965) and Belief in a 
Just World (Lerner, 1980).  
Immanent Justice. In his groundbreaking work on moral development, Piaget described 
the belief that “a fault will automatically bring about its own punishment” (Piaget, 1932/1965). A 
classic example is evident in children’s responses to the following story: after stealing apples 
from an orchard, a boy rides his bike over a rotting bridge and falls into the water. Piaget asked 
6-12 year old children why the boy fell into the water and whether the boy would have fallen into 
the water had he not stolen the apples. A sizeable number of young children reported that the 
perpetrator fell into the water because he stole the apples. In other words, the random bad event 
(falling into the water) was viewed as a direct consequence of an intentional bad action (stealing 
the apples). Other research extended Piaget’s findings to positive events, showing that children     Judgments of the Lucky 7 
believe that a positive random event will occur as the consequence of an intentional good action 
(Fein & Stein, 1977).  
Importantly, immanent justice (IJ) reasoning is a mistaken belief about the nature of 
causation. That is, people who endorse IJ reasoning are arguing that a good or bad action can 
cause a lucky or unlucky event, and consequently that the un/lucky event would not have 
occurred if the bad/good action had not occurred.  For our purposes, the most important result is 
the developmental trend of this belief.  Piaget found a decline in IJ reasoning across the 
elementary school years (Piaget, 1932/1965). Subsequently, other researchers have confirmed 
the general decline of immanent justice reasoning throughout childhood (Jahoda, 1958; Jose, 
1991; Percival & Haviland, 1978; Suls & Kalle, 1979 but cf Karniol, 1980; Najarian-Svajian, 
1966). This work has been extended more recently into samples of older teens, generally finding 
that immanent justice reasoning further decreases in middle and high school (Johnson, 1962; 
Najarian-Svarian, 1966), though there is new evidence suggesting that immanent justice 
reasoning may re-emerge in adulthood (Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Raman & Winer, 2004).   
In the current work, we examine whether young children prefer lucky to unlucky 
individuals and whether they use evidence of lucky or unlucky events to predict an actor’s future 
good or bad behavior. That is, do children think a lucky child is more likely than an unlucky 
child to perform a good action in the future? Although, this question is clearly related to 
immanent justice, there are differences between these procedures.  Immanent justice research 
focuses on how children reason about the causal consequences of intentional good and bad 
actions.  It shows a general decline in immanent justice with age, presumably because children 
integrate and articulate a more diverse set of causal principles governing the behavior of agents 
(Schult & Wellman, 1997).  By contrast, judgments of the lucky concern the evaluative     Judgments of the Lucky 8 
consequences of having viewed another’s experience of a lucky or unlucky event.  In Study 2, 
we investigate the relationship between judgments of the lucky and immanent justice by testing 
the developmental trajectories of both patterns of reasoning in the same participants.  
Belief in a Just World. The idea that people get what they deserve is at the heart of 
Lerner’s Belief in a Just World theory (Furnham, 2003; Lerner, 1980; Montada & Lerner, 1998). 
One classic demonstration of belief in a just world (BJW) involved asking participants about the 
blameworthiness of a rape victim (Jones & Aronson, 1973). Experimenters manipulated whether 
the police report revealed that the victim was a virgin, a married woman, or a divorcee, and then 
asked participants how much the victim was to blame for the rape. Counterintuitively, the finding 
was that participants blamed the virgin and married woman the most and the divorcee the least, 
though they still blamed the latter. The authors interpreted this finding and many others in terms 
of their self-protective function: if we believe the world to be a just and fair place, we can 
reinterpret or explain good and bad events that seem to befall individuals for no reason at all and, 
as a result, still feel personally safe. In this case, the authors argued that the idea of an innocent 
virgin or married woman being raped was simply so inconsistent with participants’ view of a just 
world that they derogated the victim, whereas a divorcee being raped is not as inconsistent with a 
view of the world as just and therefore less blame was necessary to maintain a sense of the world 
as just. 
BJW colors not only people’s beliefs about others but also their attitudes.   In another 
study, participants liked a person who was randomly assigned to be shocked with no 
compensation less than a person who was randomly assigned to be shocked for a payment of $30 
(Lerner, 1971). The logic of BJW predicts that the victim of uncompensated shocks was 
denigrated because of the underlying belief that a truly blameless person would not be so treated.      Judgments of the Lucky 9 
Traditionally, BJW researchers have tested these questions by examining adults’ 
responses to extreme events that were presumably strong violations of a sense of justice (e.g., 
rape, getting shocked, etc.). Less is known about whether more everyday events, e.g., seeing 
someone get splashed by a passing car, would trigger just-world beliefs. 
Additionally, the developmental origins of BJW have not been closely studied, as most 
developmental research has either focused on older children and teens (Furham, 1985; Furnham 
& Rajamanickam, 1992), or has involved tasks that have an uncertain relationship to just world 
beliefs themselves, such as distribution of resources (Lerner, 1974; Long & Lerner, 1974) rather 
than blame and evaluation (but see Fein, 1976). While little research has been conducted on 
younger children, Lerner (1977) has articulated a theoretical argument about the development of 
just world thinking (Lerner, 1977). Most notably, he argued that children move from a focus on 
getting what they want immediately to understanding that their actions at Time A can be 
rewarded or punished at Time B.  Lerner related this transition to the development of delay of 
gratification (Long & Lerner, 1974), arguing that once this “action now = consequence later” 
rule is understood, children begin to apply this understanding to other people, recognizing that a 
person’s actions now will produce consequences for him/her later. These arguments suggest that 
children may begin showing just-world beliefs in mid-childhood, somewhere around age 6 or 7. 
Lending further credence to this approximate age prediction, Lerner’s own research tends to 
employ children in middle to older elementary school, though he has demonstrated related 
principles such as an understanding of parity and equity in kindergarteners and first graders 
(Lerner, 1974). 
The current work is aimed at testing the core proposition that children, starting early in 
childhood, prefer the lucky over the unlucky.  If BJW is indeed the mechanism by which     Judgments of the Lucky 10 
preference for the lucky emerges, then preference for the lucky should emerge sometime after 
BJW reasoning has developed.  However, an alternative possibility is that the tendency to prefer 
the lucky precedes the more elaborate sort of reasoning described in BJW; if so, it should emerge 
earlier in development.  Indeed, preference for the lucky might be a core, early-developing 
tendency that is later justified via just world beliefs. The present studies provide the opportunity 
to test the development of the preference for the lucky and therefore to assess its origin in 
relation to just world beliefs. 
The current work 
Clearly one of the most important tasks children face in navigating their social world is 
determining whom to approach and whom to avoid, whom to befriend and whom to watch out 
for. Therefore, we were interested in whether children would assume that lucky people are more 
likely to engage in intentional good behaviors and unlucky people are more likely to engage in 
intentional bad behaviors. In an initial set of studies, we demonstrated that 5-7 year olds prefer 
lucky to unlucky people, and prefer members of a lucky group to members of an unlucky group 
(Olson, Banaji, Dweck, & Spelke, 2006). Here, we pursued these findings by asking whether 
children make deeper inferences about lucky and unlucky individuals, such as whether they 
believe lucky people are more likely to perform intentional good actions, whether the preference 
for the lucky is observed across cultures, and when this preference begins in childhood.  
The first two studies examine whether children judge lucky people as more likely to 
perform intentional good actions than unlucky people, and unlucky people as more likely to 
perform intentional bad actions than lucky people. In both studies we examine the developmental 
trajectory of these evaluations, and in the second study we compare this trajectory to 
performance on an immanent justice task.      Judgments of the Lucky 11 
The third study investigates whether young children show evaluative contagion for 
behavioral predictions, asking whether children believe that the siblings of lucky individuals are 
more likely to engage in intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky individuals. This 
study, as well as the final study which examines evaluative contagion in novel social groups, 
combine to suggest that evaluative contagion exists and is not limited to the American context. 
Placed alongside the work on preference for the lucky, these data suggest that the development 
of prejudice against members of disadvantaged groups may be fueled by (1) the presence of 
negative evaluations of individuals who experience unlucky events and (2) the presence of 
negative evaluations of people merely associated with those who experience misfortune, together 
resulting in prejudice against the disadvantaged either because they themselves experienced bad 
luck, or because they are associated with others who have.  
The second emphasis of the current paper is an investigation of the developmental course 
of preferences and judgments favoring the lucky. In the first three studies we test children aged 
4-12 to assess the developmental trajectory of judgments of the lucky. Previously this question 
has only been addressed using an attitude measure in children aged 5-7 (Olson et al., 2006). In 
Studies 4, 5, and 6 we investigate the basic preference for the lucky in pre-school aged children. 
Testing such young children allows us to investigate whether the developmental predictions of 
Lerner (1977) and therefore just-world beliefs, might explain such a preference. 
A final question this work seeks to examine is whether our initial discoveries of 
preferring the lucky are the result of some culture-specific teaching or whether this preference 
might be invariant across cultures. A cross-cultural test, coupled with work from very young 
children, can indicate whether a tendency or evaluation might be universal or whether it is the 
result of specific experiences or antecedents. Thus, in Studies 7 and 8 we investigate whether     Judgments of the Lucky 12 
preference for the lucky and evaluative contagion are seen cross-culturally, or whether they are 
the result of a culturally-specific experience or process.  
  Taken together, these studies have the potential to deepen our understanding of the 
preference for the lucky, judgments of the lucky, and evaluative contagion effects. They can 
inform our understanding of whether children merely prefer lucky people, or whether they make 
corresponding behavioral predictions about lucky and unlucky targets. These studies also clarify 
the relationship between preference for the lucky, immanent justice, and just-world beliefs. 
Finally, these studies allow a new understanding of the developmental trajectory and cross-
cultural generality of these effects. 
Study 1 – Behavioral Predictions of the Lucky and Unlucky 
  Learning to decide who is good and bad is a major component of successful functioning 
in the social world. Previous research suggests that even 6-month-old infants can distinguish an 
agent that helps from an agent that harms, and use this information to form preferences for the 
former (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). In addition, by 18-months, children prefer to accept a 
toy from a helpful compared to a harmful actor (Nurock, Jacob, Margules, & Dupoux, in 
preparation).  This evidence suggests that very young children evaluate agents based on their 
helpful or harmful behavior. 
  But what do children think when they observe something good or bad befalling someone?  
Do they form expectations about that person’s future behavior?   For example, do children 
believe that a person who found $5 on the sidewalk (random good event) is more likely to read a 
story to her little brother (intentional good event) than a person who was rained on while walking 
home (random bad event)? Similarly, is the person who was rained on seen as more likely to lie 
to his mother (intentional bad event) than the person who found $5? We tested this hypothesis     Judgments of the Lucky 13 
and also included comparison items in which actors were described as having previously 
performed intentional good or bad actions. Since such actions invite dispositional attributions 
and so should motivate consistent predictions about future actions, these items served as a 
standard against which to compare the impact of random events. 
Additionally, this study investigates whether there are developmental changes in the 
behavioral predictions of the lucky and unlucky across middle childhood
1. Previous research has 
suggested that children’s moral reasoning changes considerably between the age of 4 and 12 
years, and most relevantly that immanent justice reasoning declines across this age range (Piaget, 
1932/1965; Jose, 1991.) Therefore, we investigate possible age differences in children’s 
judgments of lucky and unlucky targets. While we have provided conceptual arguments for why 
these two phenomena are different, we sought to bolster this contention with a direct test.  If 
behavioral predictions following observation of random events stem from the same underlying 
process as immanent justice, we would expect to see an age-related decrease in children’s 
tendency to think that lucky people perform good actions and unlucky people perform bad 
actions. 
Method 
Participants and recruitment. Participants included 57 children (18 female) aged 4 – 12 
(M=7 years, SD=2 years) who participated while visiting a campus museum in the greater Boston 
area with their parents or guardians. One additional participant began the study but quit after 
completing less than half of the study and is therefore excluded from analyses. Participants were 
approached by an experimenter who asked if they would be interested in participating in a study 
lasting 5-10 minutes. Interested parents were asked to complete a short consent form, any 
questions of the child or parent were answered by the experimenter, and the child and parent     Judgments of the Lucky 14 
were escorted to the testing area. The experimenter then explained to the child that he/she was 
free to stop participation at any time and asked the child if he/she was ready to begin. While race 
information was not asked of participants in this study, experimenters observed that the sample 
was predominately white and middle to upper-middle class.
  
Materials. Thirty-two pictures of White children were selected from the internet and were 
arranged into 16 same-sex pairs. Pictures were paired such that both pictures had been rated by 
several adult raters as equal in attractiveness and approximate age. Of the 16 pairs, 8 were pairs 
of boys and 8 were pairs of girls. Adults’ estimates of age ranged from 4 to 12. These 16 pairs 
were then arranged into 4 same-sex sets of 4 pairs (2 all male, 2 all female). Four different 
versions of the task were created, one beginning with each set of 4 pairs, alternating between 
four pairs of boys and four pairs of girls. Side of presentation of each picture was orthogonally 
counterbalanced across participants, yielding eight versions of the task to which participants 
were sequentially assigned. 
Procedure.  Participants were presented with 16 trials. In each trial, they were first shown 
two photographs of children and were told their names and one fact about them (e.g. This is 
John. John stole a cookie from his brother). As each person was mentioned a picture of a child 
appeared on the screen. Pictures were approximately 2” X 3” and appeared on either the right or 
left side of the screen. This part of the trial is called the “learning phase” and always consisted of 
a learning pair (one fact about each of two children). After the learning phase, participants were 
asked to guess which of the two children engaged in another action (e.g. On Sunday, one of these 
children got into a fight. Which child got into a fight?). Henceforth this part of the trial will be 
called the “test phase.” Participants were instructed to point to the child that they believed 
engaged in the action in question and their responses were recorded.      Judgments of the Lucky 15 
The facts used in the learning phase were all either intentionally caused (by the actor) or 
randomly caused (not by the actor) and were either good or bad. For example, getting rained on 
or turning on the television to discover that no cartoons were on are examples of random bad 
events whereas finding $5 on the sidewalk or getting to eat cake in school because it was a 
classmate’s birthday are examples of random good events
2. In contrast pulling a classmate’s hair 
or cheating on a test were examples of intentional bad actions and helping to bake cookies for 
one’s grandmother or sharing  toys with one’s little brother were considered intentional good 
actions. A full list of items for this and all subsequent studies is available at 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm . Each pair of learning items 
was created to be as parallel as possible (e.g. accidentally hitting someone vs. purposely hitting 
someone). Across the 16 trials, four kinds of pairings were made in the learning phase: 
intentional bad vs. intentional good, random bad (unlucky) vs. random good (lucky), intentional 
good vs. random good, and intentional bad vs. random bad. These four types of learning pairings 
were crossed with each of the two possible types of test items (intentional good, intentional bad) 
in the test phase, resulting in 8 types of items. A tabular representation of the design is depicted 
in Table 2. Finally, we made two examples of each type of item (e.g., two items that were 
random good vs. random bad learning trials with an intentional bad question item), resulting in 
16 unique questions. The order of mention of the targets (e.g., mentioning lucky vs. unlucky 
first) was counterbalanced across items. 
Experimenters in this study and all subsequent studies were trained to state each item in a 
neutral/slightly positive tone, even when the item was negative in valence. Although this was a 
less natural way to state the items, this allowed us to be certain that children were not using the     Judgments of the Lucky 16 
experimenter’s tone as information in their responses and provided a more conservative test of 
our hypotheses. 
Data preparation and analyses. For each item, participants were given a 1 if they 
selected the predicted choice (e.g., the lucky target in the “lucky vs. unlucky target predicting an 
intentional good action” item) and a zero if they selected the other choice (e.g., the unlucky 
target). The four items involving the same learning pairs (e.g., lucky vs. unlucky) were combined 
such that each participant then had a prediction score between 0 (never picked the predicted 
answer) to 4 (always selected the predicted answer). Thus if a participant said that a child who 
turned on the television and found no cartoons on was more likely to cheat on a test than a child 
who turned on the television and found an extra hour of cartoons on, the participant was given 
one point for the lucky vs. unlucky prediction score. Similarly, if the participant said that the 
child who walked to school while it was sunny was more likely to bake a cake for his grandma 
than the child who walked to school while it was rainy, that participant scored one point for the 
lucky vs. unlucky prediction score. Each child ended up with four prediction scores (lucky vs. 
unlucky, intentional good vs. intentional bad, intentional good vs. lucky, and intentional bad vs. 
unlucky) unless that child failed to complete one or more questions required to complete a score. 
At most one participant was excluded from each prediction score. Prediction scores were 
analyzed using one-sample t-tests, comparing children’s prediction scores to chance (2.0). 
Finally, to examine possible age changes in predictions, we correlated prediction scores with age. 
Results 
Lucky vs. Unlucky. The comparison between lucky and unlucky targets was the primary 
result of interest. Our hypothesis was that children would believe that the unlucky target was 
more likely to perform an intentional bad action and less likely to perform an intentional good     Judgments of the Lucky 17 
action than the lucky target, consistent with predictions of judgments of the lucky. A one-sample 
t-test comparing children’s mean prediction score (M=2.47) to chance supported this hypothesis, 
t(56)=3.57, p=.001. Figure 1 shows the proportion of predicted responses made for lucky vs. 
unlucky items, and intentional good vs. bad items. Using a paired t-test we found no effect of the 
valence of the question; that is, participants were just as likely to think a lucky target would 
perform a good action as they were to think an unlucky target would perform a bad action, 
t(56)=1.53, p=.13. Additionally, there was a non-significant but positive relationship between 
age and prediction score, r=.18, p=.18, indicating that this was not likely to be related to 
immanent justice reasoning which typically shows a decline with age (Piaget, 1932/1965; Jose, 
1991). In addition, while previous work has suggested that young children have a poorer 
understanding of “randomness” in general than older children (Weisz, 1980), the increase in 
predictions based on lucky and unlucky events with age suggests that our result is not due to 
limitations in children’s understanding of randomness.  
Intentional Good vs. Intentional Bad. We were interested in whether children believed in 
behavioral consistency, thinking that a person who did something intentionally good one time 
would do so a second time and that someone who did an intentional bad action would do another. 
Previous work has suggested that young children do not tend to believe that a person will 
necessarily do the same intentional action a second time (Kalish, 2002), but here we asked 
whether the individual would do a different intentional action of the same valence.  We predicted 
they would expect valence consistency, and indeed children viewed an actor who had committed 
an intentional bad action as more likely to perform a different intentional bad action and an 
intentional good actor as more likely to perform a different intentional good action as indicated 
by a one-sample t-test comparing children’s average prediction score (M=3.19) to chance,     Judgments of the Lucky 18 
t(56)=9.27, p<.001 (See Figure 1 for proportion of predicted responses). Children were equally 
likely to think an intentional good actor would do another good action as to think that an 
intentional bad actor would do another bad action, as indicated by a paired t-test in which 
responses did not differ by valence, t(56)=1.18, p=.24. Prediction scores were correlated with 
age, r=.45, p<.001, suggesting that older children were more likely to predict consistency in the 
behavior of intentional good and bad actors. Also, as expected, children’s prediction scores were 
higher for the intentional good vs. bad comparison (M=3.19) than for the lucky vs. unlucky 
comparison (M=2.47), at least indirectly indicating that children understand a distinction 
between intentional and random behavior, t(56) = 4.45, p<.001, though the next two comparisons 
test this question more directly.  
Intentional Good vs. Random Good. To examine whether children distinguish intentional 
behavior from random behavior we asked whether children select an intentional good actor as 
more likely to perform a different intentional good action than a lucky target and whether they 
select a lucky target as more likely to perform an intentional bad action than an intentional good 
actor. We found that children make these selections, as evidenced by a one-sample t-test 
comparing participants’ average prediction score (M=2.51) to chance (2.0), t(56)=3.90, p<.001. 
Participants were equally likely to think that an intentional good actor would perform a good 
action as they were to think that a lucky target would perform a bad action, t(56)=0.14, p=.89. 
Age was not significantly correlated with prediction score, r=.14, p=.31, suggesting that children 
of all ages distinguished intentional good and lucky actors. 
Intentional Bad vs. Random Bad. In the final set of comparisons we paired intentional 
bad actors with unlucky targets and had children report which of these targets would commit 
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good actor as more likely to engage in a different intentional good action than a lucky target and 
whether they select a lucky target as more likely to perform an intentional bad action than an 
intentional good actor. We found support for this prediction, as evidenced by a one-sample t-test 
comparing the average prediction score (M=2.69) to chance (2.0), t(55)=5.17, p<.001, suggesting 
that children do in fact distinguish between actors who perform intentional bad actions and those 
who experience unlucky events, seeing the former as more likely to perform an additional bad 
action and the latter as more likely to perform an additional good action. There was no 
significant effect of the valence of the question asked, indicating that children were equally 
likely to think that an intentional bad actor would perform other bad actions as to think that an 
unlucky target would perform more good actions, as indicated by a one-sample t-test, t(56)=0.65, 
p=.52. Additionally, older children were more likely to demonstrate this prediction, as evidenced 
by a significant correlation between age and prediction score, r=.49, p<.001, a somewhat 
surprising finding given that the previous comparison of intentional good to random good 
demonstrated no significant relationship between an intentional and random distinction and age. 
Because this finding was both unexpected and did not replicate across these conceptually similar 
comparisons we will not address this issue further. 
Non-parametric analyses. Because of possible concerns about the use of parametric 
statistics throughout this and subsequent studies, analyses throughout this paper have also been 
conducted using non-parametric statistics. However, because it is more common to use 
parametric responses and because of limited space, parametric tests are always reported in this 
paper. The relevant non-parametric tests are available at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm . The findings reported in 
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Discussion  
This study provided evidence that children make behavioral predictions of lucky and 
unlucky targets. Children judged unlucky targets as more likely to commit intentional bad 
actions and less likely to commit intentional good actions when compared to lucky targets. Thus, 
children do not simply prefer lucky to unlucky targets, but make different predictions about 
lucky and unlucky targets. These differing predictions may suggest that children make enduring 
dispositional inferences about actors, and may be relying on these inferences to motivate future 
predictions, though alternative accounts could explain these findings. 
Study 1 also provided assurance that our basic method was valid in that our clearest case, 
comparisons between intentional good and bad actors, showed the expected results. Participants 
judged intentional good actors as more likely to perform other intentional good actions compared 
to intentional bad actors. Indeed, the trends for these cases were even stronger than in the case of 
random events, demonstrating that children are recognizing a difference between intentional and 
random actions.    
One possible concern regarding these results is that our participants in this study, as well 
as those in previous studies examining a preference for the lucky (Olson et al., 2006), come from 
largely advantaged populations (i.e., White, middle-to-upper middle class children with parents 
willing and able to take them to a museum, etc.). Perhaps it is because they themselves are 
“lucky” or fortunate that they show these effects. To test this possibility, a pilot study was 
conducted, with a sample of 23 participants (aged 6-12) who were all Black and all of low socio-
economic status, many living at or below the poverty line. We found that these children, like the 
children in Study 1, predicted that a lucky target would perform a good action more than an 
unlucky target and similarly that an unlucky target would perform a bad action over an unlucky     Judgments of the Lucky 21 
target,
3 suggesting that one does not need to be a member of a “lucky” group in order to show 
these evaluations.  
As previously mentioned, Piaget found a decrease in immanent justice reasoning across 
childhood. In contrast, we did not find such a pattern. If anything, the general trend was for older 
children to show behavior more in line with preference for the lucky than younger children. At 
the very least, these results suggest a developmental dissociation between immanent justice and 
preference for the lucky, militating against the idea that these phenomena arise from the same 
mental process or belief. However, to test the relationship between immanent justice and 
predictions about lucky and unlucky targets’ behavior more directly, in Study 2 we tested both 
phenomena in the same sample, allowing us to empirically evaluate the relationship between 
immanent justice and judgments of the lucky. 
Study 2 – The dissociation of immanent justice and behavioral predictions of the lucky 
  Researchers since Piaget (1932/1965) have found that children believe that intentional 
bad actions can cause unlucky events to occur, and this thinking has been applied to intentional 
good actions and lucky events as well (Fein & Stein, 1977). In these studies children are often 
told about a person who has performed, for example, a bad action and who has then experienced 
an unlucky event (e.g., a boy who stole apples from an orchard and then fell through a bridge on 
his way home). Children are then asked why the unlucky event happened and/or whether the 
unlucky event would have happened if the child had not performed the intentional bad action. 
The main result is that young children often say that the unlucky event happened because of the 
intentional bad action and that it would not have happened had the target not performed the 
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Studies have largely shown that as children get older their immanent justice reasoning declines 
(Jahoda, 1958; Jose, 1991; Percival & Haviland, 1978; Suls & Kalle, 1979).  
As we have discussed, there is a similarity, although more superficial than might seem, 
between the procedures that test the idea of immanent justice and the present work. Whereas 
immanent justice concerns reasoning about causation, the present research is not interested in 
causal relations. If anything, the causal pathway in our studies must be reversed, as children are 
told about lucky and unlucky events and then infer intentional good and bad behavior. While we 
have argued that these are conceptually distinct phenomena, in Study 2 we test this dissociation 
directly by asking the same children to perform both an immanent justice task and a “judgment 
of the lucky” task. While age should be negatively correlated with immanent justice reasoning, 
as previous research suggests, age should be uncorrelated or even slightly positively correlated 
with behavioral predictions of the lucky, as demonstrated in Study 1. 
Method 
Participants. Participants included 127 children (63 male, 64 female; 118 White, 3 Asian, 
2 Hispanic, 1 Middle Eastern, and 1 Black/White Biracial; 2 were not identified by parents and 
race/ethnicity could not be identified by experimenters) between the ages of 5 and 12 (M=8.7 
years, SD=2.0 years) in a suburban elementary school in Utah from a mostly middle-class 
background. 
Materials. Participants completed two tasks, including an immanent justice task taken 
from Jose (1990) and the “judgments of the lucky” task from Study 1. Across participants there 
were a total of 8 immanent justice stories, four in which the protagonist performed a bad action 
and then experienced a negative event and four parallel stories in which the protagonist 
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stories, the negative version involved a boy stealing apples from an orchard and then falling 
through a board on a bridge into a river on his way home, whereas the positive version involved 
a boy helping a farmer to pick apples and then finding a wristwatch on a bridge on his way 
home. Four scripts were created, each consisting of 1 version of each of the four base stories. 
Each script contained 2 positive and 2 negative stories. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
script.  
The second task involved 8 of the “judgments of the lucky” prediction items from Study 
1. These included the four items from the intentional good vs. intentional bad set and the four 
items from the lucky vs. unlucky set. The other 8 items from Study 1 (the intentional good vs. 
lucky and intentional bad vs. unlucky items) were not used, as they made the task too long for 
the youngest children, and were unrelated to the question of interest. The items were randomized 
into 3 scripts, each containing all 8 items. Participants were randomly assigned to a script. 
Across items, the order of mention of lucky and unlucky targets and the order of mention of 
intentional good and bad targets was counterbalanced.  
Procedure. Participants were brought into a conference room in the school and were 
greeted by an experimenter. They were told they would be playing 2 games and that in both 
games there were no right or wrong answers. They were also informed they could quit at any 
time (though none of the children did). Participants were sequentially assigned to either complete 
the immanent justice task and then the preference for the lucky task, or vice versa. For the 
immanent justice items, children were read a story while being shown a photograph of a boy (the 
protagonist) and then asked to recall as much as they could about the story. They were then 
asked why the good or bad action from the end of the story happened (e.g., Why did Joey fall 
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action had not (e.g., Would Joey have fallen into the river if he hadn’t stolen the apples?). For the 
luck prediction items, a picture was presented to represent each of the two targets mentioned, 
and, on the test trials, participants were asked to indicate their answers by pointing to the target 
they believed had performed the action, as they did in Study 1. After completion of both tasks 
participants were thanked for their time and returned to class. 
Results  
  Data preparation. Responses to the why (e.g., Why did Joey fall into the river?) question 
were coded by two judges, using predetermined categories from Jose (1991). The categories 
included immanent justice reasoning (e.g., He fell into the water because he stole the apples), 
mediated causality including physical mediation (e.g., He fell through the bridge because he was 
carrying so many apples) and psychological mediation (e.g., He fell because he was feeling 
badly about stealing the apples and did not see the old board), chance contiguity (e.g., He fell 
into the river because the bridge was old and the boards on the bridge were falling apart), don’t 
know responses (e.g., I have no idea), and uncodable responses (e.g., The boy didn’t fall in the 
water). Overall, raters agreed on categorization 96% of the time, and in those cases in which they 
disagreed, the coders discussed their responses and came to an agreement on a final 
categorization.  
  Participants’ answers to the why and yes/no (i.e., would x have happened if y had not?) 
immanent justice questions were used for statistical analyses only if they had correctly answered 
the memory question. A “correct” memory answer required the participant to correctly recall the 
initial action and the final action in a given story (e.g., remembering that the boy stole apples and 
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For the luck prediction items, prediction scores were computed for each category (lucky 
vs .unlucky and intentional good vs. bad) as was done in Study 1, resulting in a total score 
ranging between 0 (never selected the expected response) and 4 (always selected the expected 
response) for each participant. Children who completed all 8 items (n=126 of 127) were included 
in all analyses.  
  Immanent Justice. On the why question, children gave immanent justice responses 47% 
of the time, they gave mediated causality responses 3% of the time, chance contiguity responses 
43% of the time, don’t know responses 4% of the time, and uncodable responses 3% of the time. 
On the yes/no questions, participants said “yes” 37% of the time and “no” (the immanent justice 
response) 63% of the time.  
The proportion of immanent justice responses to the why question was negatively 
correlated with age, r= -.19, p=.033, indicating that younger children gave more immanent 
justice responses than older children. Don’t know responses and uncodable responses were also 
negatively correlated with age, r = -.22, p=.018, don’t know, and r = -.16, p=.078, uncodable. In 
contrast, mediated causality and chance contiguity responses were positively correlated with age, 
indicating that older children were more likely to use these explanations, r=.26, p=.004, mediated 
causality, r=.25, p=.004, chance contiguity. Age was negatively correlated with “no” answers on 
the yes/no question, again suggesting that younger children were supplying more immanent 
justice responses than older children, r= -.22, p=.016. 
Judgments of the Lucky. Overall children were more likely to believe that an intentional 
good actor would perform an intentional good action and an intentional bad actor would perform 
an intentional bad action (M=3.39) than expected by chance, t(125)= 19.74, p<.001, one sample-
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that an unlucky target would perform a bad action (M=2.94) than expected by chance, t(125)= 
10.33, p<.001, one-sample t-test. Performance on the intentional good vs. bad and lucky vs. 
unlucky items were correlated, r=.24, p=.007, though overall children selected the predicted 
responses more for the intentional good/bad items than for the lucky/unlucky items, t(125)=4.50, 
p<.001, paired-samples t-test, as was the case in Study 1. Additionally, age was positively 
correlated with both composites, r=.37, p<.001, intentional good/bad, and r=.19, p=.032, 
lucky/unlucky, suggesting that older children were more consistent in their responses. 
Importantly while the latter correlation was not significant in Study 1 and is significant here, the 
effect sizes in both cases were nearly identical (r=.18 in Exp. 1 and r=.19 in Exp. 2), suggesting 
that the sample size explains this difference. Thus, age was negatively correlated with immanent 
justice responses and positively correlated with judgments about the lucky and unlucky. 
The relationship between immanent justice and judgments of the lucky. Immanent Justice 
was  not related to predictions about the lucky and unlucky, as indicated by non-significant 
correlations between the why and yes/no immanent justice questions and the lucky/unlucky 
prediction composite, r= - .06, p>.50, immanent justice responses on why question, and r= -.05, 
p>0.5, “no” answers on yes/no question. Indeed, as noted, the age trends for immanent justice 
and judgments of the lucky were in opposite directions (see Table 3 for all means by age).  Thus 
both conceptual and empirical arguments strongly suggest a distinct basis for each phenomenon.    
Discussion 
Despite surface similarities between the judgments of the lucky task and immanent 
justice reasoning, these two underlying phenomena are quite distinct. We found no significant 
relationship between these measures. Additionally, whereas immanent justice reasoning 
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that the mechanism responsible for these effects is not the same. In addition to an empirical 
dissociation, we see a theoretical dissociation as well. Whereas immanent justice reasoning relies 
on a misunderstanding about causation (believing that performing a good/bad action can cause a 
lucky/unlucky event to occur), predictions of the behavior of lucky and unlucky people are not 
claims about causality. One could imagine, for examine, a person who does not believe in 
immanent justice reasoning but does believe that an unlucky person is more likely to perform a 
bad action.  
With this effect established, we move on to ask whether children’s inferences about the 
actions of lucky and unlucky targets are confined to the targets as isolated individuals, or 
whether associates of lucky and unlucky targets are also affected by the targets’ circumstances. 
In other words, are those who are related to unlucky people seen as more likely to engage in bad 
actions? And is the converse true of someone who is the relative of a lucky individual?  
Study 3 – Evaluative Contagion  
While most would argue that it is acceptable to judge someone based on his/her 
intentions, almost nobody believes it to be fair to judge another by the random events that befall 
them.  Similarly, some believe it is undesirable to judge an actor’s associate by the actions of the 
actor, even if the actor has performed a premeditated crime, but especially if the actor has been 
the victim of a random negative or positive event.  That is, making negative inferences about the 
sibling of a known thief is not deemed right by some people, but making negative inferences 
about the sibling of someone who was the victim of a robbery seems even less permissible.  
 In Study 3 we test whether such is indeed the case in the actions of children. We ask 
whether children’s behavioral predictions of the lucky extend beyond evaluations of individuals, 
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sidewalk, will children believe that Jan’s sister is more likely to perform a good action than 
Susan’s sister if Susan was splashed by a passing car? We compare these evaluations to 
evaluations of the siblings of individuals who perform intentional good and bad behaviors. Such 
a study can provide initial information about whether evaluative contagion occurs in the 
prediction of behavior.  If children evaluate people based on the events that their associates 
experience, consistent with predictions of evaluative contagion, this may illuminate how 
stereotypes and prejudice toward social groups, some of whom experience more unlucky events, 
develop.  
Method 
Participants. Ninety-four participants (48 female) between the ages of 4 and 12 (M=7 
years, SD=2 years) were recruited to participate in this study, in the same manner as Study 1. 
Participant race was not requested, however experimenters reported that participants were largely 
white and due to location (campus museum) were largely middle and upper-middle class. 
Stimuli. The exact items and pictures from Study 1 were used in Study 3 with a few 
additions. We doubled the number of pictures because a sibling was added for each actor. These 
pictures were drawn from the same database of pictures as the pictures used in Study 1. As in 
Study 1, the side of presentation of pictures was counterbalanced across participants and the 
mention of targets (e.g., lucky first vs. unlucky first) was counterbalanced across items.  
Procedure. Participants were read a script that included 16 items.  On each trial, 
participants were told the names of two children and a fact about each of them that was classified 
as either intentional good, intentional bad, lucky, or unlucky (identical to Study 1). Participants 
were also shown pictures of the siblings of each of the children. They were then told about 
another action (intentional good or bad), and were told that the sibling of one of the two initial     Judgments of the Lucky 29 
actors had performed that action. Participants were asked to point to the sibling who they 
believed performed the action. As in the previous studies, when a child or his/her sibling was 
mentioned, a picture of that child appeared on the screen. Below is a complete example of an 
intentional comparison (for a full list of items, see 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm): 
This is Ross (picture appears) and his brother (picture appears). Ross shared his toys with his 
neighbor. (Intentional Good) 
This is Liam (picture appears) and his brother (picture appears). Liam stole a toy from his 
neighbor.  (Intentional Bad) 
The brother of either Ross or Liam punched a classmate. Which brother punched his classmate?   
(Intentional Bad) 
Below is a complete example of a random comparison: 
This is Jeff (picture appears) and his brother (picture appears). On Saturday Jeff turned on the 
television and found that there were no cartoons on. (Unlucky) 
This is Todd (picture appears) and his brother (picture appears). On Saturday Todd turned on 
the television and found that there was an extra hour of cartoons on. (Lucky) 
Either Jeff’s or Todd’s brother helped the teacher clean up after art. Which brother helped his 
teacher? (Intentional Good) 
This study took slightly longer than previous studies and therefore halfway through the 
script (after 8 items) we routinely asked participants if they wanted to keep playing. Often 
children, especially the younger ones, wanted to stop. We always allowed children to stop 
whenever they asked, and the majority, if they stopped, stopped after 8 items. Therefore we also 
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completing each item. In total, 20 participants did not complete all 16 items; however all 
participants, except the one described below, completed at least 6 items.  
Data Preparation and analyses. Several participants were dropped from analyses for the 
following reasons: participants always picked the same side of the screen or picked the same side 
of the screen on 15 of 16 trials (N=10), the parent interfered during the task (N=2), the 
participant quit after 1 item (N=1), or the child clearly did not understand the task (N=3). After 
these exclusions our sample included 78 participants (41 female), ages 4 to 12 (M=7 years, SD=2 
years).  
We then computed prediction scores in the same manner as in Study 1; however, because 
20 participants did not complete all of the items, we had to exclude these participants from any 
prediction score in which they did not answer all 4 items
4, resulting in a sample of 58-63 
participants for each prediction score (comparable to the number of subjects in Study 1). 
Data was prepared and analyzed using the methods described in Study 1. 
Results 
Lucky vs. Unlucky. In our main comparison of interest, we found that participants were 
significantly more likely to pick the sibling of the unlucky target to perform an intentional bad 
action than the sibling of a lucky target, who was in turn selected to be more likely to perform a 
good action, as indicated by a one-sample t-test comparing the mean prediction score (M=2.48) 
to chance (M=2.0), t(57)=3.51, p=.001 (see Figure 2 for proportion of predicted responses). That 
is, children generalized evaluations of an actor to the moral behavior of his or her siblings. It was 
possible that this significant effect was driven largely by either children believing that the 
siblings of lucky people would do more good things or that the siblings of unlucky people would 
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difference based on the valence of the prediction question, t(57)=0.90, p=.37. As in Study 1, in 
Study 3 we found that age did not correlate significantly with prediction score for the lucky vs. 
unlucky comparison, though it was in the positive direction, r=.15, p=.25.   
Intentional Good vs. Bad. The sibling of the intentional bad actor was judged as more 
likely to perform another intentional bad action than was the sibling of the intentional good actor, 
and vice versa for a different intentional good action, as indicated by a one-sample t-test 
comparing the average prediction score (M=2.66) to chance, t(58) = 4.52, p<.001 (see Figure 2 
for proportion of predicted vs. unpredicted responses). This result suggests that, barring other 
information, children will use the purposeful behavior of one sibling to predict the purposeful 
behavior of another sibling. A non-significant paired-sample t-test indicates that this effect was 
equally driven by participants’ tendency to see the sibling of an intentional good actor as likely 
to perform a good action and by participants’ tendency to see the sibling of an intentional bad 
actor as likely to perform a bad action, t(58)=0.15, p=.89. As in Study 1, age was correlated with 
performance on the intentional good vs. bad comparison, r=.44, p<.001, again suggesting that 
older children show more consistency across trials than younger children. 
Intentional Good vs. Lucky. Surprisingly given the previous results, participants did not 
distinguish between the siblings of intentional good and lucky targets in predicting behavior of 
siblings, as indicated by a one-sample t-test comparing the mean prediction score (M=2.15) to 
chance (2.0), p>.30. Thus, children did not make a significant distinction between whether a 
target’s sibling performed an intentional good action or experienced a lucky event in evaluating 
that target’s future behavior. There was no significant difference between predictions of good vs. 
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performance on this comparison and age was not significant, just as it was not significant in 
Study 1, r=.06, p=.63. 
Intentional Bad vs. Unlucky. In a similar vein, across all participants, children did not 
distinguish between intentional bad actors vs. unlucky targets in predicting sibling behavior 
(M=2.17), p<.15. They did not evaluate the sibling of a intentional bad actor to be any more or 
less likely to perform a different intentional bad action than the sibling of an unlucky target. 
Additionally, there was a correlation between age and this comparison, r=.31, p=.013, suggesting 
that older children tended to show this expectation more than younger children (as they did in 
Study 1). Again there was no significant difference between prediction scores for good and bad 
prediction items, t(62)=0.11, p=.91. 
Discussion 
  Study 3 demonstrated that children are willing to evaluate people based on the actions 
and experiences of their siblings. The negative evaluation of unlucky people observed in Studies 
1 and 2 ‘rubs off’ on children’s evaluations of their siblings—they are seen as more likely to 
perform other bad actions. In the same vein, siblings of lucky people are viewed as more likely 
to perform intentional good actions. These findings provide evidence that evaluative contagion 
exists and that children’s preference extends to the associates of lucky vs. unlucky people. 
  Surprisingly, children seem to lose the distinction they make in Study 1 between 
intentional and random events when evaluating the siblings of targets. While children view 
siblings of intentional good actors as likely to engage in intentional good actions when compared 
to intentional bad actors, they do not believe that siblings of intentional good actors are more 
likely to do so than siblings of lucky targets. Similarly, while siblings of intentional bad actors 
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intentional good actors, they are not seen as more likely to do so than the siblings of their 
unlucky counterparts. Lending further evidence to this claim is the fact that, unlike in Study 1, 
there is no significant difference between the mean scores on the intentional good vs. bad items 
and the mean scores on the lucky vs. unlucky items, t(56)=0.67, p=.51.  In other words, whether 
a child was robbed or a robber, the sibling is viewed equally negatively despite the fact that the 
evaluations of the actual “robbed child” or “robber child” may have differed. A possible 
explanation for this pattern is that siblings merely get tagged with a valence (good vs. bad), and 
the nature of the original source event is not involved in the subsequent evaluation. We will 
return to this “affective tagging” hypothesis in the General Discussion, but taken together with 
past findings (e.g., Olson et al., 2006), one could see how being a member of an unlucky or 
otherwise disadvantaged group could lead to being negatively evaluated, even if the member 
being evaluated was not the person involved in the original negative event (such as the siblings 
in this study). 
These first three studies stand as evidence of the breadth of the preference for the lucky 
and evaluative contagion effects. These phenomena extend beyond judgments of preference to 
beliefs about the likelihood of future action, including both predictions of a target’s actions and 
the sibling of a target’s actions.  
All three studies also demonstrated a small increase in the consistency of behavioral 
predictions of lucky and unlucky targets over development, from roughly age 5 through age 12. 
In the next three studies we further investigate the development of preference for the lucky by 
testing whether even younger, preschool-aged children show a preference for the lucky. 
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  The question of how early this preference emerges has not been broached. In the current 
research we test this question directly, by creating a simple task that very young children can 
perform. Namely, we present children with pairs of targets and ask them simply “who’s nicer?” 
As in the Study 1, here we compare children’s evaluations of lucky and unlucky targets, but also 
compare intentional good to intentional bad actors, intentional good to lucky targets and 
intentional bad to unlucky targets.  
  Thus, we explored the emergence of these distinctions in 2.5-4.5 year old children. 
Evidence of a failure (random performance) at one age and a success at the following age would 
suggest that either a distinction begins to be made during this period or that the task is too hard 
for children below this age. To differentiate between these two possibilities we can compare 
performance on the comparison of interest (lucky vs. unlucky) to the other three comparisons 
(intentional good vs. bad, intentional good vs. lucky, intentional bad vs. lucky). If we see that 
children are performing above chance in an expected direction on at least one comparison, this 
suggests children understand the task and are simply failing to make the lucky vs. unlucky 
distinction. If they fail at all tests, it either means that young children fail to make all distinctions, 
or more likely, that children are failing to understand the task.  
Because so many cognitive and social psychological changes occur in children during 
this time (e.g., emergence of reasoning about false beliefs, Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001, 
Gopnik & Astington, 1988), we placed children into narrower 6-month age ranges to determine 
exactly how they are performing at each age. For ease of discussion we label each age group by 
its lower bound (e.g., kids aged 36-41 months are called 3.0 year olds). This sample includes not 
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This allows us to test (beyond the pilot study mentioned in the discussion of Study 1) whether 
our results are limited to majority group participants.   
Finally, this study, by using children this young, sheds light on whether Belief in a Just 
World is a likely explanation for children’s preference for the lucky. As was described in our 
introduction, Lerner (1977) predicted that the origins of just-world beliefs are tied to learning to 
delay gratification and a transition away from egocentrism. Additionally, his theory postulates 
that children must understand the relationship between their behavior and the consequences that 
occur later, and then must apply this understanding to the behavior of others. All of these 
abilities are beyond the scope of young preschoolers (Harris, 1992; Kurdek, 1979; Kurdek & 
Rodgon, 1975; Mischel & Mischel, 1983), so evidence of a preference for the lucky in young 
preschoolers would shed some doubt on BJW theory as an explanation for preference for the 
lucky in young children. 
Method 
Participants. Twelve 2.5 year olds (5 female; 33.2-36.9 months, M=35.1 months, SD = 
0.77 months), thirty-one 3.0-year olds (16 female, 36.3-41.9 months, M=39.0, SD=1.8), twenty-
nine 3.5 year olds (16 female, 42.0-47.8 months, M=45.2, SD=1.6), twenty-seven 4.0 year olds 
(18 female, 48.0-53.6 months, M=50.4, SD=1.9), and sixteen 4.5 year olds (8 female, 54.1-59.9 
months, M=56.7, SD=2.1) participated. This sample was considerably more diverse than the 
previous studies, as it included 44 Whites, 11 Blacks, 19 Asians, 10 Hispanics, 2 Native 
Americans, 17 Biracial participants and 12 whose parents did not specify. All participants were 
recruited while attending a university preschool in California. 
Stimuli. Twenty-four pictures (12 male, 12 female) were selected from a larger database 
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age. Twenty-four statements were also created such that six involved intentional good events, six 
involved intentional bad events, six involved random good experiences, and six involved random 
bad experiences (for the full list of items see 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm ). An object was used to 
represent each statement (to minimize memory demands) and a photograph of a child was 
included to represent the target. For example, for the item “[John] helped his parents with the 
chores” a vacuum cleaner icon was presented along with a unique picture of a boy. Each 
statement/object/photograph set was paired with another on a page of a flipbook. In total 
participants saw 3 intentional good-intentional bad pairs, 3 random good-random bad pairs, 3 
intentional good-random good pairs, and 3 intentional bad-random bad pairs.  
In total, 8 versions of the task were created to counterbalance for gender of targets, item 
effects, and the side of the flipbook each photograph appeared on. The order of mention of 
targets (e.g., lucky vs. unlucky) varied across items.  All subjects completed items in the 
following order, although the exact items differed across version: IG (intentional good) –IB 
(intentional bad), RG (random good) –RB (random bad), IG-IB, RG-RB, IG-IB, RG-RB, IG-RG, 
IB-RB, IG-RG, IB-RB, IG-RG, IB-RB. This order was selected because the first six items were 
the primary ones of interest and we were initially concerned that our younger children might not 
sit through 12 items (though they did). Participants were sequentially assigned to one of the eight 
versions. 
Procedure. Participants were brought to a small room and sat next to the experimenter. 
Children were told “We're going to play a game. This game is called the “Who’s nicer?” game. I 
will tell you about some people and then I’ll ask you ‘Who's nicer?’  Does that make sense? Are 
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reading the pairs one at a time until participants completed all 12 items or something caused the 
participant to finish early (e.g., a fire alarm).  Five participants (4%) participated but were 
excluded because they failed to complete all 12 items. Failure to complete the study was the 
result of accidents, such as fire drills, or a child having an accident during the task. 
Results 
  Data Preparation. For each type of comparison, a separate score was computed, giving 
children 1 point each time they selected the predicted response (intentional good for IG-IB 
comparison, random good for RG-RB comparison, intentional good for IG-RG comparison, and 
random bad for IB-RB comparison). Each child therefore had a score that ranged from 0 (never 
picked the predicted response) to 3 (always picked the predicted response) for each type of 
comparison. Scores were always compared to chance (1.5) using a one-sample t-test.   
  Overall Results.  Across all participants, responses for all composites differed from 
chance in the predicted direction, intentional good vs. intentional bad (M=2.06, SD=.88), 
t(114)=6.82, p<.001, lucky vs. unlucky (M=1.87, SD=.88), t(114)=4.48, p<.001, intentional good 
vs. lucky (M=1.86, SD=.94), t(114)=4.10, p<.001, intentional bad vs. unlucky (M=1.81, 
SD=.90), t(114)=3.69, p<.001.  
  Having a range of ages also allowed us to look for correlations between age and 
performance. Age was correlated with all of the composites such that older children had higher 
scores on all composites, intentional good vs. intentional bad, r=.46, p<.001, lucky vs. unlucky, 
r=.31, p=.001, intentional good vs. lucky, r=.46, p<.001, intentional bad vs. unlucky, r=.35, 
p<.001.  See Figure 3 for a break-down of responses by age. Finally, we found no significant 
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2.5 year olds and 3.0 year olds. None of the indices differed significantly from chance for 
2.5 year olds, ps>.35, or for 3.0 year olds, ps>.15.  
3.5 year olds. 3.5 year old participants judged the intentional good actors to be nicer than 
the intentional bad actors (M=1.93, SD=.88), t(28)=2.63, p=.014, the lucky targets to be nicer 
than the unlucky targets (M==2.03, SD=.78), t(28)=3.70, p=.001, the intentional good actors to 
be nicer than the lucky targets (M=1.86, SD=.88), t(28)=2.23, p=.034, and the unlucky targets to 
be marginally nicer than the intentional bad actors (M=1.79, SD=.82), t(28)=1.93, p=.064. 
4.0 year olds. Four-year old participants judged the intentional good actors to be nicer 
than the intentional bad actors (M=2.52, SD=.75), t(26)=7.03, p<.001, the lucky targets to be 
nicer than the unlucky targets (M=2.15, SD=.91), t(26)=3.71, p=.001, the intentional good actors 
to be nicer than the lucky targets(M=2.52, SD=.64), t(26)=8.23, p<.001, and the unlucky targets 
to be nicer than the intentional bad actors (M=2.07, SD=1.00), t(26)=3.40, p=.002.  
4.5 year olds. The 4.5 year old participants also viewed the intentional good actors as 
nicer than the intentional bad actors (M=2.63, SD=.72), t(15)=6.26, p<.001, the lucky targets as 
nicer than the unlucky targets (M=2.13, SD=.81), t(15)=3.10, p=.007, the intentional good actors 
as nicer than the lucky targets (M=2.19, SD=.91), t(15)=3.02, p=.009, and the unlucky targets as 
nicer than the intentional bad actors (M=2.25, SD=.77), t(15)=3.87, p=.002.  
Discussion 
  Across ages, a consistent pattern emerged such that around age 3.5 children were able to 
make distinctions between those who performed intentional good vs. bad actions and between 
those who experienced lucky vs. unlucky events, and made further distinctions between those 
involved in intentional vs. random actions. In particular, it is interesting that these distinctions 
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the task was simply too difficult for younger children. Study 6 addresses this possibility by 
testing children in an even simpler task. 
   Our previous study of attitudes toward the lucky and unlucky had looked exclusively at 
children over the age of 5.0. The current study allows us to see that four year olds do in fact 
demonstrate this preference and that even 3.5 year olds do. Additionally, this study newly 
examined the age at which children begin to distinguish between evaluations of intentional actors 
and random targets. Most of the studies conducted comparing intentional to accidental events 
have examined older children (Elkind & Dabek, 1977; Surber, 1982) or collapsed over large age 
ranges and therefore have not conclusively demonstrated that 3.5 year olds show this distinction 
(e.g., Shultz & Wells, 1985; Yuill & Perner, 1988; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980) We have 
demonstrated that the distinction between intentional and random is made reliably around age 3.5 
years. At this age, children recognize that an individual is “more good” or “more bad” if she 
performed such actions with intent than if she happened to be a mere recipient of such events.    
  A less interesting explanation for this effect needs to be addressed. It is possible that 
these studies created a preference for the lucky by forcing such a response.  That is, perhaps 
young children actually preferred the lucky and unlucky targets equally but merely demonstrated 
this bias because they had to select an answer, a judgment they would not have offered if left 
alone. While such a result is still interesting, this possibility is worth testing, and we do so in 
Study 5. 
Study 5 – Do young children actually think the lucky and unlucky are equally nice? 
  In Study 5 we examine the possibility that our findings in Study 4 are the result of an 
experimental demand. To test this possibility, in Study 5 we present children with a forced 
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with the same stimuli as Study 4, but were instead asked “Who’s nicer, [Johnny], [Jimmy], or 
they’re exactly the same?” If anything, this option should create a new demand—to employ use 
of the “exactly the same” response, given its neutral stance and presence as an option. If 
children’s natural inclination is not to differentiate between lucky and unlucky targets, then we 
should see children providing more “exactly the same” responses than “lucky” responses, and we 
should see the difference between lucky and unlucky disappear. In contrast, if children believe 
that lucky is better than unlucky, we should continue to see the lucky targets selected more often 
than the unlucky, in spite of the presence of an “exactly the same” response.   
Method 
Participants. Participants included 49 children (33 female) between the ages of 4.0 and 
5.5 years (M=54.7 months, SD=5.1 months) attending the same university preschool as those in 
Study 4. Two subjects were excluded from analyses because they did not understand the task, 
resulting in 47 children (33 female, M=55.0 months, SD=5.1 months). This study also employed 
a diverse sample (racial/ethnic breakdown: 19 White, 4 Black, 7 Asian, 7 Hispanic, 5 bi-racial or 
multi-racial, and 5 did not specify). We included these ages because they had most clearly 
demonstrated the effects in Study 4.  
Stimuli and design. The stimuli were identical to those presented in Study 4, though the 
exact items were randomized. This time the 12 items included six comparing lucky to unlucky 
and six comparing intentional good to bad (since these were the primary questions of interest and 
we wanted to collect more data on these items from each participant). The items of most interest 
(lucky vs. unlucky) were presented first. The intentional good vs. intentional bad items were 
included to test whether the new option, “exactly the same”, changed performance on the clearest 
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always responded “exactly the same” for each lucky vs. unlucky item, this could either be 
because he thought that random events were not indicative of niceness, or because he did not 
understand the task. We therefore included intentional good vs. intentional bad to distinguish 
between these two cases. If a child used the “exactly the same” response for every random 
comparison but stopped using the “exactly the same” response for any of the intentional good vs. 
intentional bad items, as a few children did, then we kept the child in the data set, because it 
seemed clear that he understood the task. If a child used the “exactly the same” response for all 
12 items (including intentional and random), we hypothesized that the child did not understand 
the task, since it seemed unlikely that a child would believe that in all cases an intentional bad 
actor was just as nice as an intentional good actor. The latter situation occurred only 1 time and 
this child was excluded from the dataset (one of the two excluded above). In total, 4 versions of 
the task were created, consisting of two different scripts, each with the order described above. 
The scripts were then counterbalanced to control for the side of the page a given photograph 
appeared on. In all scripts the order of mention was varied across items. 
Procedure. First children were given three training trials, for what we described as the 
first game, the “Who’s taller? game.” The experimenter explained that two people would appear 
and the task would be to say which one was taller: the first one, the second one or they are 
exactly the same. In these trials two stick figures were presented. In the first two trials one was 
clearly larger than the other and the experimenter indicated which one she would select if asked 
“Who’s taller?” In the third trial two stick figures of the same size were presented, differing in 
color, and the experimenter indicated that she would say “They’re exactly the same.” Data were 
not recorded for this task, but anecdotally children seemed to understand and often shouted their 
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experimenter said that the subject would get to play a game but that it was a little different than 
the “Who’s Taller? game”. Instead, the game would be the “Who’s Nicer? game”, and children 
could select either person or could say “they’re exactly the same.” All children said they 
understood, and the experimenter began. Children were read each of the twelve pairs of items 
and were then asked, “Who’s nicer, [Alex], [Andrew], or they’re exactly the same?” As a 
conservative test, we added “exactly the same” as the final response, as anecdotally we have 
observed that children have a tendency to pick the last option given. Children indicated their 
responses either by pointing or stating their response.  
  Data preparation. For the six items of each type (random or intentional), a score was 
computed, tallying the number of times the good, bad, or exactly the same response was given. 
Each score was then compared to chance using a one-sample t-test. 
Results and discussion 
  Results. Contrary to a task demand explanation, we found that children continued to 
select the lucky targets (M=3.14 out of 6) as nicer more often than chance (2.0), t(48)=4.11, 
p<.00l (see Figure 4). Because these responses were interdependent, it is therefore not surprising 
that the unlucky targets were selected less often than chance (M=1.14), t(48)=-4.83, p<.001, and 
the exactly the same response did not differ from chance (M=1.71), t(48)=-0.97, p=.34. Not 
surprisingly, children also selected the intentional good actor most often for the intentional items 
(M=4.59) and this was selected more often than chance (M=2.0), t(48)=10.48, p<.001 (see Figure 
4). The intentional bad actors were selected less often than chance would predict (M=0.63), 
t(48)= -10.07, p<.001, and the exactly the same response was also selected less than chance 
(M=0.78), t(48)=-5.92, p<.001. A summary of the results can be seen in Figure 4.     Judgments of the Lucky 43 
  One possible explanation for these results was that children were simply reluctant to use 
the “exactly the same” response and therefore this might have been an unfair test. However, a 
full 55% of children used this response at least once during the task.  For these subjects, we 
computed a “preference for the lucky” score by subtracting the number of times they selected the 
unlucky as nice compared to the number of times they selected the lucky as nice. We compared 
this value to zero using a one-sample t-test and found that even these subjects selected the lucky 
more than the unlucky, t(26)=2.06, p=.05. 
  These results suggest that the findings in Study 4 were not simply the result of a forced-
choice task. Instead we found that young children continued to articulate that the lucky target 
was nicer than the unlucky target. Of course, children did use the “exactly the same” response 
from time to time. But they did not do so more often than they selected the lucky target, and the 
addition of this option did not undermine the preference for the lucky over the unlucky. 
Study 6 – Preference for the Lucky Using a Simplified Task 
  A remaining concern from Study 4 is the difficulty of the task for children under 3.5 
years of age. This possibility is suggested by evidence that 2.5 and 3.0 year old children were no 
more likely to select the intentional good actor than the intentional bad actor as nicer. Despite 
our attempts to make Study 5 simple, perhaps the memory and attention load (learning and then 
remembering what two different people did before making a response) was simply too great for 
our youngest participants. Thus, in Study 6, rather than presenting pairs of targets and asking 
children to remember both before selecting an answer, in this study we presented one target at a 
time and simply asked children whether each target was “nice or not nice.” Because Study 4 
demonstrated a preference for the lucky in children beginning at age 3.5, in this study we tested 
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Method 
  Participants. Participants included 25 3.0 year old children (11 female, aged 36.7-41.8 
months, M=39.3 months, SD=1.5) recruited from either the same campus nursery school in 
California as the children in Studies 4 and 5 (N=12) or from a lab database in Massachusetts 
(N=13). Participant race was not recorded, but we estimate the final sample was approximately 
60% White and the remaining 40% evenly distributed between Black, Asian and multi-racial 
participants. 
  Procedure. Participants were brought to a small testing room and were seated next to the 
experimenter. The experimenter told the child that he/she was going to see some other kids and 
be asked whether each target was “nice or not nice”. Participants were presented with a total of 
24 targets, 6 of each type (lucky, unlucky, intentional good, intentional bad) in one of four 
possible scripts (2 randomized orders X 2 gender orders). The complete list of items used is 
available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm . 
Results and Discussion 
Data preparation and analyses. In general children showed an overall “nice” preference, 
indicating they were more like to say “nice” than expected by chance (50%), t(24)=2.27, p=.032, 
and this was true for some participants more than others. We were not concerned with this fact, 
however, given that this bias should have been equally prevalent across item types and our 
analyses were within subject. A composite score was created for each type of item, such that the 
total number of “nice” judgments (out of 6 possible) was computed for each subject. We then 
compared these means using paired-sample t-tests.  
Participants most often selected the intentional good actors as nice (M=5.0, SD=2.1), 
followed by the lucky targets (M=4.2, SD=2.0), then the unlucky targets (M=3.4, SD=2.1) and     Judgments of the Lucky 45 
finally the intentional bad actors (M=2.4, SD=2.2) and this pattern was demonstrated by a 
significant linear trend, F(1, 24)=24.12, p<.001 (See figure 5). Additionally all paired t-tests 
indicated differences, most notably the lucky targets were more often labeled as nice compared 
to the unlucky targets, t(24)=2.16, p=.041, and the intentional good actors were labeled as nice 
more often than the intentional bad actors, t(24)=5.17, p<.001. Finally, children also selected the 
intentional good actors as nice more often than the lucky targets t(24)=2.22, p=.036 and the 
unlucky targets as nice more often than the intentional bad actors, t(24)=3.69, p=.001. Thus, by 
simplifying the attentional and memory demands of the task, we demonstrated that even children 
aged 3.0 prefer lucky to unlucky individuals.  
In a pilot version of this study with 2.5 year olds we found that this task was too difficult 
for them. Children at this age either said “nice” for every item or simply refused to provide an 
answer, suggesting that to ask whether children younger than 3.0 show a preference for the 
lucky, a completely new, perhaps non-verbal task, needs to be created. 
  Across Studies 4-6, our results indicate that even very young preschoolers demonstrate a 
preference for the lucky over the unlucky. This preference appears when lucky and unlucky 
individuals are pitted against each other in a forced choice, when children have an explicit option 
to like lucky and unlucky targets equally, and when they are presented serially. Such a finding 
causes some problems for the fullest “just world” explanation. Lerner’s (1977) hypotheses about 
the emergence of just-world thinking would suggest that children need to be many months if not 
years older in order to show the earliest evidence of just world thinking. His explanation requires 
that children move beyond the “pleasure” principle to the “reality principle,” which is expected 
to occur around ages 6 or 7. Even with the most generous definition, three years of age is clearly 
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development, that 3.5 year olds have the cognitive capacities and awareness, such as perspective-
taking and delay of gratification, required for just-world types of reasoning (Kurdek, 1979; 
Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975; Mischel & Mischel, 1983).  
These results provide clear support for the hypothesis that a preference for the lucky is in 
place by age 3.0, and it may be present prior to that age. It is possible that in future research with 
new procedures such a preference may be detected even earlier. It is also possible that a simpler 
version of the just-world belief – e.g. a basic belief that good things happen to good people and 
bad things happen to bad people, without a deeper understanding of the complexity of the world 
or an ability to inhibit their actions – is held by very young children, though establishing that 
such a ‘theory’ is in place would require additional work. 
One of the major undertakings of the current paper was to investigate how widespread the 
preference for the lucky is. We have now demonstrated that it is seen in children ranging in age 
from 3 to 12, that older children extend this preference to predictions of the intentional behavior 
of lucky and unlucky targets, and that they extend the preference to the siblings of the targets. In 
the final two studies we investigate whether preference for the lucky and evaluative contagion 
appear cross-culturally. 
Study 7 – Cross-cultural evidence of the preference for the lucky  
  In two final studies, we asked whether the preference for the lucky is constrained to the 
minds of young children from Western cultures, or whether it might instead be a preference held 
by young children across very different cultures. As our first test of this question we investigated 
whether young children who are raised in a culture that appears to promote fewer trait-inferences 
than the U.S. will show this same preference. Research on causal attributions has examined 
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explanations of human behavior (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Morris & Peng, 1994)
 5. Though 
sometimes the findings have been mixed, when differences have been found, they have tended to 
fall along Eastern (Japan, India, etc.) vs. Western (US, England) lines, with Easterners tending to 
use more situational explanations for behavior and Westerners using more dispositional 
explanations (Krull, Loy, Lin, Wang, Chen, & Zhao, 1999; Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Morris & 
Peng, 1994). As noted, it is possible that dispositional attributions are at the heart of children’s 
preference for the lucky. That is, perhaps because American children live in a culture that values 
dispositional attributions, they tend to blame unlucky targets and credit lucky targets, essentially 
over-extending dispositional explanations to random events. Therefore, Japan stands as an 
interesting test-case for examining cultural variability in the preference for the lucky over the 
unlucky.  If children in both cultures show a preference for the lucky over the unlucky, then 
cultural differences in attributions likely do not explain the preference for the lucky effect.  
  For these tests we employed a simple test of preference for the lucky in the form of liking 
judgments of lucky and unlucky targets. Such a test allowed us to examine whether Japanese 
children differentially evaluated lucky and unlucky targets, rather than asking them to predict 
behavior (a task we reasoned required a more elaborated judgment and if differences occurred 
they could be explained by several factors). Additionally, by employing the selected method we 
could compare the results to published findings with an equivalent American sample (Olson et 
al., 2006).  
Method 
  Participants. Twenty-six children from rural Japan participated; three were excluded due 
to poor participation (e.g., giving the same response to every item), resulting in 23 participants 
(10 female; aged 4;0-7;3; M=5). These ages were selected to approximately match those used in     Judgments of the Lucky 48 
Olson et al. (2006) which employed an identical method. In actuality, this sample was 
approximately 6 months younger than that sample. 
  Stimuli. In total 40 vignettes were created, 10 of each type (intentional good, intentional 
bad, lucky, unlucky). The full list of items is available at 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm . These items were 
scrambled and divided into lists of ten items each. The items were then scrambled again and four 
more lists were created, making a total of 8 lists. Each list contained at least one item of each 
type, the gender of the targets alternated by item, and participants were sequentially assigned to a 
list. All items were taken from Olson et al. (2006) and were translated into Japanese by the 
second author and then checked and back-translated by two native Japanese speakers to ensure 
accuracy. The only changes made were those necessary to maintain understanding (e.g., in the 
American version the target found $5 on the sidewalk, in the Japanese version the target found 
500 yen; names were changed from Mike to Minoru, for example).  
  Procedure. First children were trained on how to use a 6-point smiley-to-frowny face 
scale they were to use later in the study. The experimenter gave examples of how he would 
evaluate different people (e.g., his mother vs. his neighbor) using the scale and asked the child if 
he/she understood how to use the scale. Children were then read one of the scripts which 
included 10 items describing the actions of an individual or an event experienced by an 
individual (e.g., [Tarou] helped his teacher). After reading each vignette, children were asked to 
indicate how much they liked each actor using the 6-point smiley-to-frowny face scale. These 
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Data preparation. Following the procedure of Olson et al. (2006), the average rating for 
each type of target (intentional good, intentional bad, lucky, unlucky) for each participant was 
computed. Paired t-tests were used to compare ratings of targets. 
Results and Discussion 
  Ratings. Japanese children preferred intentional good targets (M=4.68) to intentional bad 
targets (M=3.06), t(22)=3.61, p=.002, and lucky targets (M=4.24) to unlucky targets (M=3.12), 
t(22)=2.87, p=.009 (see Figure 6). These results support the claim that Japanese children have a 
preference for the lucky over the unlucky, despite living in a culture that tends to use fewer 
dispositional attributions, and despite employing a non-forced choice method. Interestingly, the 
difference between intentional bad actors and unlucky targets was not significant, p>.75 and the 
difference between intentional good actors and lucky targets was only marginally significant, 
t(22)=1.85, p=.08. Additionally, we computed the difference between evaluations of intentional 
good and bad actors and the difference between evaluations of lucky and unlucky targets. We 
then compared these differences and found there was no significant difference, t(22)=1.32, 
p=.20. That is, Japanese children made (almost) no distinction between whether targets engaged 
in intentional behavior or experienced random events. 
  Importantly, the effect size of the preference for the lucky in this sample is very similar to 
the equivalent effect size in the US sample reported in Olson et al (2006) which used the same 
task and a comparable age range (d=1.07 in US, d=.93 in Japan). However, the comparison of 
intentional good vs. intentional bad actors suggests a large difference between the Japanese and 
American samples. While both groups prefer the intentional good to intentional bad targets, the 
effect size in the American sample is over twice as large as the effect size in the Japanese sample 
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American and Japanese people’s use of dispositional vs. situational explanations. Additionally, 
in this sample, participants made no significant distinction between the intentional bad and 
unlucky targets, and only a marginal distinction between the intentional good and lucky targets. 
In comparison, American children made a large distinction between intentional bad and unlucky 
targets and also a marginal distinction between intentional good and lucky targets.  
These results suggest that young children in cultures that vary in evaluations of 
intentional acts nonetheless blame victims of bad fortune and reward recipients of good fortune 
in similar ways. Both show a preference for the lucky. In this result we have initial evidence of 
cross-cultural generalizability of the preference for the lucky, and from a country with a culture 
that provides a meaningful test. In our final study, we took this initial result one step further to 
ask whether Japanese children also showed evaluative contagion. 
Study 8 – Cross-cultural similarity in evaluative contagion 
  We asked whether Japanese children extend their preference for the lucky to entire social 
groups. Children were presented with members of two novel groups, one group that contained 
some members who had experienced lucky events and one group that contained some members 
who had experienced unlucky events. Critically, both groups had some members who 
experienced neither lucky nor unlucky events (see Levy & Dweck, 1999, for a similar 
procedure). Children were then introduced to these new members of each group and were asked 
to indicate which group member they preferred.  
Method 
  Participants. Eighty-seven participants (49 female, ages 4-7 years, M=5.8 years, SD =1 
year) from rural Japan completed the study. One other participant completed the study but due to 
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  Stimuli. An artist drew cartoons of 6 children, 3 boys and 3 girls. The same 6 pictures 
were used to represent members of each of the groups; the only difference across groups was the 
color of their shirts. The lucky and unlucky events were taken from Study 7 and the neutral items 
were either described as something the actor liked to eat (e.g. Yuko likes oatmeal) or an activity 
the actor engaged in (e.g. Ayumi rides her bike).  
  Procedure. Participants were presented with four trials. On each trial they were told 
about members of two groups. The groups were never explicitly labeled and were distinct only 
because of shirt color and which side of the screen they appeared on (e.g. cartoons in blue shirts 
were always on the right side of the screen and cartoons in green shirts were always on the left 
side of the screen). Cartoon children appeared on the screen one at a time, alternating groups 
(e.g., first a blue t-shirt child appeared and then a green t-shirt child). As each picture appeared, 
participants were told one fact about that child. For Group A, three of the five children were 
described as experiencing lucky events and two were associated with neutral facts. In Group B, 
three of five children were described as experiencing unlucky events, with the final two being 
associated with neutral facts. After the 10 group members had appeared on the screen, two final 
children appeared, one from each group. These two children, the targets, were identical except 
for shirt color, and each appeared on the same side of the screen as the other members of their 
group. Participants were asked which of these two targets they liked better. Two unique trials 
like the ones described above were created and two additional trials were created substituting 
intentional good actions for lucky events and intentional bad actions for unlucky events, resulting 
in 4 final trials (the exact items used are available at 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~banaji/research/olson_luck.htm ). The lucky group, the     Judgments of the Lucky 52 
unlucky group, the intentional good group and the intentional bad group each appeared on the 
left once and on the right once. 
Data preparation. Data preparation and analysis was identical to that used in Study 2 of 
Olson et al (2006). The two lucky vs. unlucky items were combined into a composite and the two 
intentional good vs. bad items were combined into a separate composite. Each composite was 
computed by giving the subject one point each time they picked the good/lucky actor, resulting 
in an index score between 0 (never picked the good/lucky actor) to 2 (always picked the 
good/lucky actor). Because only three scores were possible (0, 1, or 2), non-parametric tests were 
necessary. Overall results were analyzed using Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit tests (chance was 
computed to be 25% for 0, 50% for 1, and 25% for 2). 
Results and Discussion 
  Findings. Children’s preferences differed significantly from chance for both the 
intentional good vs. bad comparison, χ
2(2, N=87)= 6.45, p=.040, and the lucky vs. unlucky 
comparison, χ
2(2, N=87)= 16.22, p<.001, (see Figure 7). Inspection of the data indicated that 
children were more likely to prefer the member of the intentional good group compared to the 
member of the intentional bad group and, consistent with evaluative contagion, also preferred the 
new member of the lucky group to the new member of the unlucky group.  
  These results demonstrate that Japanese children evaluate individuals based on the 
actions and experiences of others who are socially associated with them.  Again, a comparison to 
the comparable U.S. sample is in order. As in Study 7, the effect sizes for these two samples are 
nearly identical for evaluations of people associated with those experiencing random good and 
bad events (w=.45 in US, from Olson et al., 2006, w=.43 in Japan). Also as in Study 7, American 
children showed three times  as large an effect size for intentional good vs. bad items compared     Judgments of the Lucky 53 
to Japanese children (w=.83 for US, w=.27 for Japan). Once again, we found that Japanese 
children showed less of a bias against intentional bad groups compared to American children, 
just as they showed less of a bias against intentional bad individuals compared to American 
children.  
In sum, children growing up in Japan, a culture in which dispositional attributions have 
been observed to be weaker than in Western cultures, show both a preference for the lucky over 
the unlucky as well as evaluative contagion, providing the first cross-cultural tests of these 
phenomena. These results suggest the generalizability of evaluative contagion across cultures. 
Japanese children looked nearly identical to American children on this task, preferring members 
of predominantly-lucky groups to members of predominantly-unlucky groups.  
General Discussion 
Across 8 studies we have demonstrated that children show a robust tendency to judge the 
lucky positively.  This preference is revealed by a variety of methods, and is present in children 
from a wide range of ethnicities, races, towns, states, countries and social classes, including 
predominantly White middle to upper-middle class elementary school children in Utah and 
Massachusetts, low-income Black children in Massachusetts, preschool children from a wide 
range of ethnicities in California, and rural Japanese children. Across these many samples and 
tasks, several results emerged clearly.  Young children prefer lucky individuals to unlucky ones, 
children predict that the lucky are more likely to perform intentional good actions and the 
unlucky are more likely to perform intentional bad actions, and children extend these predictions 
and evaluations to the siblings and group members of lucky and unlucky individuals. 
Another major finding of these studies was that the preference for the lucky appeared at a 
very young age. We cannot conclude that children below age 3 years do not prefer the lucky,     Judgments of the Lucky 54 
only that they did not do so in our task, which may simply have been too hard for them. Methods 
such as looking time and reaching behavior have been used successfully with young infants and 
even non-human primates in other cognitive and social cognitive tasks (Baillargeon, Spelke, & 
Wasserman, 1985, Nurock, et al., 2007; Santos & Hauser, 1999), and perhaps creative 
researchers can design studies to test whether children (or even other species) prefer the lucky. If 
evidence for this effect in young infants or other primates is found, it would suggest that this 
preference is either innate or grows readily out of early cognition, perhaps in conjunction with 
early socialization.  
The current studies also provided initial evidence that the preference for the lucky is not 
constrained to Western societies, by showing the same tendencies in Japanese school children as 
in their American counterparts. While suggestive of cultural invariance, this preference should be 
examined in countries that differ from the US and Japan in meaningful ways, such as in their 
beliefs about or experience with luck, in order to test further for cultural invariance. For example, 
do children who live in surroundings in which they have very little control over their 
environments, and therefore experience unlucky events frequently (e.g., children in refugee 
camps in Sudan), prefer those who experience lucky events to those who experience unlucky 
events, or does their own experience attenuate or even reverse this preference?  
The value of these results is based both on the empirical demonstrations themselves as 
well as the theoretical questions they resolve.  Two theories stood out as deserving a test 
alongside the phenomena of preference for the lucky and evaluative contagion: immanent justice 
and belief in a just world.  Despite a similarity in the structure of the test of immanent justice and 
the present studies, the results demonstrated a clear dissociation between the two.  Whereas 
immanent justice decreased across age, judgments of the lucky did not, and, if anything,     Judgments of the Lucky 55 
increased across childhood. Additionally, by demonstrating a preference for the lucky in very 
young children, we minimized the likelihood that just-world beliefs, as they have previously 
been described (Lerner, 1977), drive the preference for the lucky in young children. 
In a set of related studies in progress, we are investigating the hypothesis that the 
preference for the lucky is not driven by justice-related concerns at all, but rather that a simpler 
mechanism may be responsible for these effects (Olson, Heberlein, Spelke, Dweck, & Banaji, in 
preparation). In particular, we are investigating the possibility that the affect associated with a 
good or bad event (whether intended or not) ‘rubs off’ on the individuals experiencing those 
events, resulting in evaluations of the individuals that are consistent in valence with the events, a 
process we call “affective tagging.” Importantly this hypothesis is more parsimonious than many 
of the justice theories and makes some differing predictions. For example, whereas just world 
theory predicts that a preference for the lucky should primarily occur when the events described 
are extreme and threaten a person’s sense of justice, the affective tagging hypothesis predicts that 
lucky individuals will always be associated with some positivity and unlucky individuals will 
always be associated with some negativity (though in some cases other factors such as empathy 
or impression formation may work in opposition to these evaluations). This prediction is relevant 
to the current studies because the items we selected in these studies are trivial events, hardly the 
events likely to violate one’s sense that the world is just. Therefore, the fact that we see a 
preference for the lucky even for these events provides some initial evidence in favor of the 
affective tagging hypothesis.  
The reader may wonder whether children “grow out” of the preference for the lucky or, 
alternatively, whether this preference continues across childhood into adulthood, increasing as 
the trajectory of the data in this paper might suggest. One could imagine that after the age of 12,     Judgments of the Lucky 56 
the developmental trajectory shifts and adolescents grow out of this belief. Even if this were the 
case, a dislike of particular unlucky groups may nonetheless become entrenched in childhood 
and continue into adulthood, long after the mechanism that formed them has ceased to operate. 
Another possibility is that adults continue to hold these judgments or even increase them, leading 
to a continuation of prejudice toward unlucky and disadvantaged people and groups.  Our 
research in progress using a similar paradigm suggests that these preferences seem to continue 
through adulthood, though they abate considerably; this apparent abatement may be due to adults 
becoming more reluctant to express the preference publicly. In a simple replication of Study 1, 
we found that adults show the same pattern of believing lucky targets are more likely to perform 
good actions and unlucky targets are more likely to perform bad actions. A preference for the 
lucky was also found with American adults in a conceptual replication of Study 7, showing that 
they prefer people who experience lucky events to those who experience unlucky events, even 
using a non-forced choice design.  
As discussed above, this liking of the lucky and disliking of the unlucky is similar to 
many related findings that suggest people and things are evaluatively “tagged” based on the 
valence of other information associated with that individual or thing. For example, research has 
shown that adults tend to dislike the bearer of information they disagree with even when the 
bearer of the information herself disagrees with that information being shared (Manis, Cornell, & 
Moore, 1974) and that adults will see an individual as, for example, more angry if that individual 
has described another person as angry (Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, & Crawford, 1998).  In 
addition, even novel objects elicit rapid evaluation (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 
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other humans, a prediction at the heart of the affective tagging hypothesis (Olson, et al., in 
preparation). 
Implications 
Although the preference for the lucky may seem an innocent bias, it is possible that it has 
important and insidious repercussions, in particular because those expressing it are young 
children. In the real world, random events are, by definition, out of the control of the individuals 
experiencing them, but they are not completely random in whom they affect. Rather, some 
groups (those that are disadvantaged) tend to experience these types of events more than others. 
Hurricane Katrina stands as a striking example of the unequal impact of random events on 
members of advantaged vs. disadvantaged groups. A disproportionate number of those who were 
stranded in New Orleans were disadvantaged, a disproportionate number of those who died were 
disadvantaged, and the impact on the lives of those who survived was greater for the victims who 
were members of disadvantaged groups. Therefore, what at first appears an innocuous belief, that 
lucky people are better than unlucky people, may actually lead to a systematic bias against 
disadvantaged people and groups, resulting in both the inculcation and perpetuation of prejudice 
in children.  
If it is true that the preference for the lucky and the contagion of these judgments play a 
role in the development and maintenance of prejudice, then this would suggest that to fight 
prejudice and its development, it is not enough to censor racist remarks, do sensitivity training in 
schools, and read politically correct stories. As long as negative outcomes continue to fall 
disproportionately on some groups, we may be unwittingly providing our children with evidence 
they use to infer that group’s inferiority. This means that parents, teachers and society must not 
only come to understand the preferences young children hold, but that if we wish to change the     Judgments of the Lucky 58 
impact of these preferences, society needs to rectify the injustices that cause disadvantage and/or 
develop strategies to counteract young children’s early preferences. 
Thus, these preferences may be one of the origins of or contributing factors to the 
development of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination, perhaps via the development and 
maintenance of group hierarchies. Such a conclusion is relevant to social psychological discourse 
on system-justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and social dominance theory (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). Both theories suggest that people are motivated to maintain the status quo in which 
some social groups have a higher status than others; a preference for the lucky may be one such 
attitude that contributes to the maintenance of group hierarchies. It is possible that the preference 
for the lucky is a mechanism for the development and maintenance of system-justifying and 
social dominance beliefs as well as more specific social group attitudes.  We believe this to be a 
promising avenue of future research.  
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Footnotes 
1. Social cognition research with adult participants has found that adults overestimate their 
ability to predict the behavior of individuals, for example thinking they can predict one’s year-
long performance in the Peace Corps from a single interview when in fact interviews are poor 
predictors of actual performance (participants estimated r= .59 between interview performance 
and Peace Corps performance when in fact r<.10; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986).  That work differs 
from the work proposed here.  Those authors were concerned with accuracy of predictions 
compared to reality, as opposed to the current work, which is focused on whether children will 
make systematic predictions in a particular direction to reveal an underlying belief that lucky 
people will perform good actions.  
2. An anonymous reviewer raised an important concern that perhaps children saw lucky items as 
good, rather than lucky, converting what is a preference for the good into a preference for the 
lucky. For example, this reviewer pointed out that getting to eat cake for a classmate’s birthday 
might be seen as “good” by children and not as “lucky.” Similarly, one could argue that children 
perhaps see unlucky events as bad, rather than unlucky. One piece of evidence against this 
argument is the finding throughout this paper that children differentially evaluate lucky and good 
actors and they distinguish unlucky and bad actors. However, as a more direct test of this 
concern, we conducted a small-scale pilot study. We presented a new group of 26 children aged 
5-10 years, with each of the lucky and intentional good items from Study 1 and asked them to 
state whether each item was something lucky that happened to the target or whether the actor 
“meant to do good” (we used this phrase because “intentional good” is confusing for a 5 year 
olds). A partially overlapping group of 26 children aged 5-10 years old completed the parallel 
task for unlucky and intentional bad actions. Overall, the pilot participants identified 75.5 % of     Judgments of the Lucky 67 
the lucky targets as lucky, 74.0% of the intentional good targets as intentional good, 88.5% of the 
unlucky targets as unlucky and 83.3% of the intentional bad targets as intentional bad. Chance 
responding would have been 50%, and the reviewer’s predictions would have suggested results 
significantly lower than 50% for the lucky and unlucky items, which we did not find. We are 
therefore confident that children did understand that the lucky events were lucky and that the 
unlucky events were unlucky. 
3. These participants were presented with only two items comparing lucky and unlucky targets. 
In one item they were asked which target would perform an intentional good action and in the 
other item were asked which target would perform an intentional bad action. Participants were 
given one point if they selected the lucky target to perform the intentional good action and one 
point if they selected the unlucky target to perform the intentional bad action, resulting in scores 
of 0, 1, or 2 for each subject. The distribution of these scores was compared to a binomial 
distribution (25% chance of “0”, 50% chance of 1, 25% chance of 2). We found that this pilot 
sample selected the predicted responses more often than chance, as indicated by a Chi-square 
Goodness of Fit test, χ
2 (2) = 7.09, p=.029.  
4. Due to concerns about the number of participants excluded in these analyses, we re-analyzed 
the data using proportions, so that a child who completed only 2 lucky vs. unlucky items but 
selected the predicted response on both items would get a score of 1.0, the same as a child who 
completed 4 items and always selected the predicted response. Note, however, that a child who is 
distracted for one item would look very different when s/he has answered 2 questions than 4 
questions. In the former case the child would get a score of .5 (chance) whereas in the latter case 
the child would get a score of .75 (better than chance). This is why we did not analyze the data     Judgments of the Lucky 68 
using this strategy in the text; this limitation not withstanding, the results of these proportion-
based analyses were almost identical to those reported in the text using overall scores. 
5. The few studies that have directly examined cross-cultural causal attributions in children have 
been conducted by Joan Miller (1984, 1986). In those studies she asked children to 
spontaneously name examples of intentional good and bad actions from their lives and tested 
whether their explanations for these actions were more situational or dispositional. Her studies 
differed in several significant ways from the current work: there was no investigation of random 
events, the events were produced by the subjects not the experimenters, the children were older 
than those presented here, and her sample was Indian not Japanese. She found no significant 
differences across Indian and American cultures in children’s tendency to use situational vs. 
dispositional explanations.  
6. In this figure and Figure 2, the proportion of unpredicted responses is simply (1 – proportion 
of predicted responses). Since including both the predicted and unpredicted bars is redundant, we 
only included the predicted responses in these graphs.     Judgments of the Lucky 69 
Table 1. Sample size broken down by age for each study (after exclusions). 
  Age    
  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Total 
Ss 
Exp. 1           6  9  6  10  6  10  6  3  1  57 
Exp. 2                 8  25  23  19  14  17  14  7  127 
Exp. 3           14  11  19  7  8  4  7  6  2  78 
Exp. 4  12  31  29  27  16                          115 
Exp. 5           23  17  9                       49 
Exp. 6     25                                   25 
Exp. 7           7  9  4  3                 23 
Exp. 8           21  30  28  8                 87 
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Table 2. A schematic representing the items presented in Studies 1 and 3. In the learning phase 
participants were introduced to two characters (and their siblings in the case of Study 3). 
Participants were then asked which of the two characters (or their siblings in Study 3) would 
perform a different intentional good or bad action in the Test Phase. We have also listed the 
predicted response used to conduct analyses. The types of items with asterisks were included in 
Study 2.  
 
Learning Phase  Test Phase (Who would perform an…?)  Predicted Response 
*Intentional Good vs. Intentional Bad Intentional Good Action  Intentional Good 
*Intentional Good vs. Intentional Bad Intentional Bad Action  Intentional Bad 
*Lucky vs. Unlucky  Intentional Good Action  Lucky 
*Lucky vs. Unlucky  Intentional Bad Action  Unlucky 
Intentional Good vs. Lucky  Intentional Good Action  Intentional Good 
Intentional Good vs. Lucky  Intentional Bad Action  Lucky 
Unlucky vs. Intentional Bad  Intentional Good Action  Unlucky 
Unlucky vs. Intentional Bad  Intentional Bad Action  Intentional Bad 
      Judgments of the Lucky 71 
Table 3. Proportion of responses on immanent justice task by type and mean prediction score on 
lucky/unlucky and intentional good/bad behavioral prediction items by participant age. N 
indicates the sample size for each age group. When two numbers are present, the valid sample 
size varied depending on the dependent variable. "No" responses indicated proportion of 
participants saying "no" on the yes/no immanent justice question. The rows starting with "why" 
include the proportion of participants at each age giving each of the possible responses to these 
items. Finally, the Lucky/Unlucky and Int. Good/Bad rows indicate the average number of times 
(out of 4) that participants at each age selected the "Good/Lucky does good" or "Bad/unlucky 
does bad" responses. 
  Age 
  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
N  7, 8  24, 25  22,23  19  14  16, 17  13, 14 
"No" responses  0.44  0.79  0.71  0.67  0.61  0.60  0.54 
Why - Imm Just  0.49  0.44  0.69  0.47  0.42  0.42  0.30 
Why - mediation  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.09 
Why - Chance  0.36  0.39  0.27  0.41  0.47  0.54  0.59 
Why - Don't 
know  0.12  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.00 
Why - 
Uncodable  0.04  0.07  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.02 
Lucky/Unlucky  2.75  2.28  3.22  3.05  3.36  3.06  2.85 
Int. Good/Bad  2.62  3.08  3.22  3.47  3.64  3.88  3.54 
     Judgments of the Lucky 72 
Figure 1. Mean proportion of responses in which participants selected the predicted response in 
Study 1
6. The predicted response was selecting the lucky or intentional good actor to perform a 
good action and selecting the unlucky or intentional bad actor to perform a bad action.  
Figure 2. Mean proportion of responses in which participants selected the predicted response in 
Study 3. The predicted response was selecting the sibling of the lucky or intentional good actor 
to perform a good action and selecting the sibling of the unlucky or intentional bad actor to 
perform a bad action.  
Figure 3. Mean number of times in Study 4 that children at each age selected the lucky or 
intentional good actor as nicer than the unlucky or intentional bad actor. A score of 1.5 equals 
chance. Asterisks indicate the mean differed significantly from chance. 
Figure 4. Mean proportion of times in Study 5 that each actor was selected as the “nicer” one 
across 6 lucky vs. unlucky items and across 6 intentional good vs. intentional bad items in which 
the option “exactly the same” was also given.  
Figure 5. Mean liking rating for intentional good, lucky, unlucky, and intentional bad actors in 
Study 7 as rated by Japanese children. Higher scores indicate greater liking and error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. 
Figure 6. Proportion of Japanese children’s responses across items in which they preferred the 
new member of the intentional good or intentional bad group in the intentional good vs. 
intentional bad comparisons (left panel) or the member of the lucky or unlucky group in the 
lucky vs. unlucky comparisons (right panel) in Study 8. 
 
 
  